A Critical Analysis of a Catastrophic Strategic Blindspot in the Wake of the 2026 US-Israeli War on Iran
Hichem Karoui, Guest Researcher at China-Arab Research Center on Reform and Development (Shanghai International Studies University).
Introduction
The Middle East is characterized by a very strange, and disturbing, geopolitical dichotomy: while the Gulf Cooperation Council countries openly express deep concerns about Iran’s quest for nuclear arms and ballistic missiles, they show a remarkable lack of interest, or even passive tolerance, in Israel’s proven nuclear arsenal and territorial expansionism. This imbalance of threat perception is not a rational one based on a security calculation, but rather one that has its origins in sectarian manipulation, great-power patronage, and regime self-interest. The results of this strategic blindness have been disastrous in the wake of Operation Roaring Lion, the US-Israeli military operation that began on 28 February 2026 which has completely undermined the region and the regimes of the area that have been nurtured with this double standard.
This paradox can be grasped by studying the four overlapping dimensions: the ideological construction of Iran as a sectarian threat, the strategic need of the Gulf monarchies to American hegemony, the instrumentation of Israeli power as a counterweight to Iran, and the public-private gap between the public’s support for Palestine and the governments’ tacit cooperation with Israel. But the 2026 war has driven home the fragility of this balance: Israel’s proven eagerness to wage devastating war has proven more destabilizing than Iran’s measured deterrence.
The Iranian Threat: Sectarian Identity and Strategic Insecurity
The Gulf Arab states’ preoccupation with Iran’s nuclear ambitions should not be detached from regional politics’ general structure of sectarian anxiety that has dominated since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This competition has been viewed largely in sectarian terms (Sunni Arabia versus Shia Iran), although geopolitical considerations of power, influence, and resources seem increasingly to account for animosity more than religious convictions.
The toppling of Saddam Hussein, the regional rival of Iran, in post-2003 Iraq, has decisively shifted the power balance. The U.S. had previously been able to contain Iran via Iraq, but faced a drastically changed regional environment with Iran’s influence dramatically growing in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. (Yaseen et al. 2024) The Gulf Arabs lacked the historical balance they had enjoyed, and were now confronted with a new strategic reality – namely, Iranian influence spreading through the Levant and into their homes via Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, the Houthis and others.
But the geopolitical rivalry was played out as a purely sectarian conflict that enabled Gulf governments to achieve a number of things at once. First, sectarian rhetoric gave domestic legitimation to the authoritarian rule, and enabled the unification of the diverse populations, as Sunni vs Shia became an organising principle, and gave regimes a justification for suppressing domestic opposition, including the minority Shia communities within Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Second, sectarian framing enabled the Gulf states to define Iran as an existential threat, an emotionally-charged and politically mobilisable definition more powerful than one based on rational assessment of military capabilities and intentions. Third and most significant for the Israel paradox, is the sectarian framing that allowed for a rhetorical inversion: Iran, with much less destructive power than Israel, was defined as the greatest danger, while Israel’s power was justified and even desirable as a bulwark against Persian expansion.
This study contends that the Saudi-Iran rivalry goes beyond sectarian identity itself, being more driven by the security dilemma and mutual uncertainty. But the use of the sectarian as a securitising narrative has been so entrenched in the political discourse of the region that the concept of material threat and constructed threat has been lost. The very language of the Iranian threat suggests a sectarian threat, not a hegemonic or geopolitical threat, as well as a faith-based, preemptive assumption of Iranian evil, while Israel’s capabilities are elevated to the realm of deterrence and regional balance.
The US Security Architecture and Great-Power Patronage
This paradox of Gulf Arab threat perception cannot be explained without an understanding of the structural dependency of Gulf monarchies to the United States’ security guarantee. The Trump administration’s exit from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 and its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran were warmly welcomed by the Gulf allies, in particular Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Gulf states were key constituencies that welcomed American pressure on Iran because they lacked any independent military means to monitor Iran.
The signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain in 2020 marked the first time that some Gulf states acknowledged that the Israeli military is not a threat, but rather a potential partner in combating the Iranian threat to their security. (Yetim and Kaşıkcı 2025) This normalisation process was clearly “driven in large part by apprehensions over perceived threats from Iran and Islamist groups. The paradox of the Abraham Accords was that Gulf states adopted a model in which Israel’s military superiority would not be a source of concern but a strategic opportunity, as they institutionalised the alignment of security with a nuclear armed Israel.
Most importantly, it came amid Israel’s explicit territorial ambitions by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israeli ministers’ claims to expansion between the Euphrates and the Nile were not meant to be disqualifiers to the partnership, but rather the Gulf states argued that the short-term requirement of containing Iran outweighed long-term fears of Israeli territory expansion. This was a short-term tactical move for short-term gains, at the expense of considering regional stability in the long term, and the 2026 conflict has proved to be a disastrous misjudgment.
Outline the Logic of the Double Standard: Sectarianism as Cover for Hegemonic Realignment
The double standard in threat perception is an indication of a more fundamental logic that can be called, in a certain sense, “sectarian laundering” of hegemonic competition. Iran’s nuclear program is spun as an ideologically-motivated effort in the name of revolutionary Shia ambitions for regional hegemony and export of Islamic revolution. In contrast, Israel’s nuclear arsenal is described as a “fact of life”, an unfortunate but “stable” reality that should be taken for granted, not questioned.
There are several key asymmetries which are not accounted for in this framing. First, Iran’s nuclear programme has been strategic, but has been hampered by the international oversight mechanisms, the UN Security Council resolutions and, under the JCPOA, by intrusive inspections. Israel’s nuclear weapons programme, by contrast, has grown without International control and it is estimated that Israel has between 80 and 400 warheads, carried by aircraft, missiles and submarines. The imbalance of responsibility is very pronounced, and it is Iran that is labelled with the threat of existentialism.
Second, the divergence in the definition of intent: Iran’s intent as ideological imperialism (Khomeinism, Shia expansion) versus Israel’s intent as defensive deterrence is very significant, and suggests an asymmetry between the two sides. If Iran acquires ballistic missiles, it’s said to be a sign of hegemonic ambition, while if Israel acquires nuclear capable aircraft and submarine-launched missiles it’s said to be existential insurance. The attributions of intent differ, not because there is a difference in capability, but because there is a difference in alignment with US interests.
Most provocatively, the Gulf states’ lack of interest in Israel’s explicit territorial ambitions suggests that it’s not really a matter of concern over regional power seeking expansionist ambitions, but specifically Iran. The core of the argument, in the absence of the sectarian trappings, is simple: Iran is a geopolitical competitor whose policies are hostile to U.S. interests; Israel is a geopolitical ally whose policies are friendly to U.S. interests; Iran therefore is the problem, and Israel is the solution – or at least the American solution.
The 2026 War: Catastrophic Consequences of Strategic Miscalculation
The start of Operation Roaring Lion on 28 February 2026 has revealed the basic miscalculation behind the strategic gamble of the Gulf states based on the notion that Iranian influence is best addressed by the use of Israeli-American military superiority. The operation, aimed at Iran’s nuclear facilities and military bases, effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, the route used by most of the oil exports of the Gulf states. The conflict did not stop Iran; it sparked a debacle in the economy that has undermined the very regimes that have allowed the war. The war has confirmed worries about the vulnerability of the Gulf Arab nations, the Americans’ ability to protect them and the potential dangers of prolonged instability. Worse, it has shown to be a liability rather than an asset to stability in the Gulf, as an unrestrained Israel is an existential threat to the security of the region. The war has not taken the wind out Iran’s sails or its influence in Iraq, Syria or Lebanon. Instead, the war has resulted in the lopsided reduction of conventional military power in Iran and a corresponding increase in its incentive to retaliate asymmetrically—which is directly threatening the oil infrastructure, maritime trade, and economic survival of the very countries that backed the war. (Zeeshan 2026) The 2026 war has not brought stability to the region but rather has set the stage for further Israeli strikes, fueling the Gulf’s insecurity and Iranian retaliation, in a self-perpetuating cycle of war.
The Palestinian Cause and the Failure of Compartmentalisation
One major aspect of the Gulf states’ strategic dilemma is that they cannot maintain a state of public compartmentalisation between the state’s support for Israel and the domestic constituencies’ strong attachment to the Palestinian issue. The normalisation agreements had hoped to separate Israel from the Palestinian issue, declaring it a regional issue; but the reality of public opinion in the Gulf societies has been more difficult to conquer by this logic.
The October 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel and the ensuing Gaza War established the fragility of the premise that public opinion should be separated from government policy that was assumed by the Abraham Accords. At the same time, Gulf governments became stuck between official security collaborations with Israel and intense pressure exerted by Palestinian civilians. The failure to present a coordinated response by the Gulf states to the Gaza crisis, with Saudi Arabia halting talks on normalisation, Qatar broadening mediation efforts and the UAE and Bahrain maintaining official recognition but taking a cautious approach, exposed the weakness of the normalisation framework.
The compartmentalisation has been further challenged by the 2026 war. The war has shown that Israeli military operations are not surgical or limited, but rather cause regional destabilisation which in turn poses a threat to the prosperity and stability of the Gulf states themselves, making the contradiction between security cooperation with Israel and popular support for Palestinian rights impossible to reconcile. The price of the partnership is tangible and real rather than abstract and deferred.
Iranian Power’s Resilience and the Bounds of Kinetic Solutions
Iran has proved more resilient than Israeli or American policymakers expected, despite their massive military operations against its nuclear and strategic infrastructure. Despite the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the regime managed to pass the baton to his successor Mojtaba (Ivanov 2025). Iran’s multi-faceted power arrangement with clerical leadership and military-security establishment has been more resilient than the analysts had forecast.
More importantly, the war has proved that kinetic solutions are sometimes inadequate in the face of geopolitical competition. The influence of Iran in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen is not something that can be destroyed by bombing nuclear facilities, since it is based on historical ties, sectarian unity and institutional relationships. Asymmetric warfare—drone warfare, cyber warfare and support of non-state proxies—is an attractive option for the Iranian government given the loss of its conventional military forces. (Koybaev 2026) The net result of the war in 2026 could be that Iran is even more determined to implement precisely those asymmetric tactics that pose the greatest danger to the Gulf’s oil infrastructure and maritime trade.
The church was divided into sects and the regions were fragmented
Just as the war has revealed Iran’s weaknesses in controlling its regional allies, it has also demonstrated Iran’s inability to hold the Gulf Arab bloc together. The 2011 Arab Spring and more importantly the intra-GCC crises that ensued showed that a mutual sense of threat from Iran was a not enough foundation for lasting cooperation. This fragmentation has been exacerbated during the 2026 war. Oman and Qatar, the most balanced of the approaches to Iran, have not supported the American-Israeli military operation, but have also not pulled back from engagement with the West. Saudi Arabia, which is still bound by the partnership framework, is subject to economic constraints that restrict its capacity to go on a military campaign. The UAE with its more varied economic and energy interests has maintained a more pragmatic hedging policy.
Meanwhile, sectarianism, which was meant to bring Gulf Sunni monarchies together against Shia Iran, has turned out to be more than a weak link in preventing unity.Meanwhile, sectarianism, which was supposed to help unite the Gulf Sunni monarchies against Shia Iran, has proven to be more of a weak link in the chain of preventing unity due to state-centric interests, regime survival concerns, and divergent visions of the future of the region. The war has only exacerbated these deep divisions among the GCC. (Jahandad and Mustafa 2023)
In the end, the flawed strategic framework is unraveling
The Gulf Arab states’ double standard in threat perception – that of Iran’s nuclear programme as an existential threat, while Israel’s nuclear arsenal and territorial ambitions are tolerated – was a specific moment in post-Cold War Middle Eastern geopolitics when America’s hegemony seemed to be stable and sustainable. The three premises of the framework were that Iranian power would be held in check by military pressure and by pressure of sanctions; that Israel would be a reliable and durable partner in containment; and that the costs of this alignment could be contained from public opinion and long-term regional stability.
The 2026 war has proved all three of these premises to be false. The costs of the alignment are evident for the Gulf societies and regimes, while Iranian power has proven resilient against military assault, and Israeli military action has proven destabilizing. Conditions that the strategic gamble was supposed to bring have been reversed by the war: economic disruption, regional instability, loss of American credibility, and increased Iranian resolve for asymmetric retaliation.
At a more general level, the catastrophe exposes a prime principle of Middle Eastern geopolitics: that security can only be secured through a sectarian framing, great-power patronage, and instrumental engagement with a state with expansionist territorial objectives, which will not lead to stable regional security. The double standard in terms of threat perception – between Iran and Israel – was never an analytical issue that could be rationally assessed. Instead, it seemed to indicate a specific form of power in which the Gulf States had no autonomy and, therefore, their own definition of threat. The 2026 war has hastened the decline of America’s hegemony, and the Gulf states have found that they have placed their security in arrangements that are failing to deliver on their promises, and in doing so have alienated themselves from their own publics and the wider currents of regional politics.
The journey ahead will not only involve realignment, but a new thinking of Gulf security policy based on diversification, pluralist regional dialogue, and a realistic assessment of the power of Iran and Israel in the light of multipolarity.
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