A Key Concept in Xi Jinping’s Foreign Policy

Dr. Hichem Karoui [1]

Among the many formulations associated with Xi Jinping’s foreign policy, few have been as central, repeated, and symbolically important as the idea of building “a community of shared future for mankind”. The phrase has appeared in major Party documents, speeches at the United Nations, forums on global governance, and bilateral declarations with countries across Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East. It functions at once as a diplomatic slogan, a moral claim, and a strategic framework. To some outside observers, it may initially sound abstract, even utopian. Yet within the logic of contemporary Chinese diplomacy, it expresses a coherent view of world politics: that increasing interdependence has made zero-sum competition both dangerous and outdated and that international stability depends on cooperation grounded in sovereignty, development, and mutual benefit (Zhang, 2018).

This concept deserves serious attention because it reveals how China wishes to describe its rise and how it seeks to reshape the language of international order. Rather than presenting itself as a revolutionary power bent on overturning the system by force, Beijing portrays itself as advocating for a global framework that is more compatible with multipolarity, development needs, and civilisational diversity. The “community of shared future for mankind” is therefore not merely rhetorical ornamentation. It is an attempt to set out a normative vision of world affairs in which states remain sovereign, but their destinies are increasingly linked through trade, climate, security, technology, health, and infrastructure. In this vision, coexistence is not a choice among many; it is the basic condition of twenty-first-century politics.

To understand the rise of this formulation, we must consider it in the context of China’s broader diplomatic transition under Xi Jinping. Earlier phases of reform-era foreign policy were characterised by caution, restraint, and a preference for keeping a low international profile while concentrating on domestic development. By contrast, the Xi era has seen a more self-assured China articulate not only its interests but also its preferred principles for organising world politics. Concepts such as the Belt and Road Initiative, win-win cooperation, a new type of international relations, and global development, security, and civilisational initiatives all connect in some measure to the idea of a shared future. Together they suggest that China no longer seeks merely to adapt to an international order largely defined by others; it aims to participate in defining the terms of legitimacy, cooperation, and reform (Deng, 2024).

In official Chinese discourse, this notion is often linked to a number of key principles:

• The first principle is sovereign equality. States, irrespective of size, wealth or military strength, are said to deserve equal respect within the international system. This reflects long-standing Chinese sensitivities rooted in the country’s own historical experience of foreign domination and imposed inequality. It also resonates strongly with many postcolonial states that remain wary of interventions justified in the name of civilisation, democracy, or humanitarian necessity.
• The second principle is common development. Economic growth is treated not simply as a domestic matter but as the foundation of international peace. Poverty, underdevelopment and exclusion are seen as structural causes of conflict and instability.
• The third principle is dialogue rather than confrontation. Rather than dividing the world into ideological camps, China argues for negotiations that accommodate difference.
• The fourth is mutual learning among civilisations, rejecting the notion that one political or cultural model possesses a universal entitlement to judge others.
• Finally, there is the principle of shared responsibility for global problems, especially those that no single state can solve alone.

These themes have roots in both Chinese political tradition and more recent diplomatic doctrine. The language of harmony, though sometimes misunderstood abroad as implying uniformity or passive consensus, has in Chinese intellectual history often suggested the possibility of order through balance and coexistence among differences. Modern Chinese diplomacy, especially since the reform era, added to this inherited vocabulary the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence we have previously mentioned.

The “community of shared future for mankind” can be seen as a contemporary extension of these principles into an era shaped by global integration. It retains sovereignty as a core premise but combines it with a stronger acknowledgement that domestic and international outcomes are deeply intertwined (Qin, 2018).

Xi Jinping’s speeches have framed the concept in language that merges strategic realism with aspirational universalism. He often contends that humanity now resides in the same global village, with converging interests and interconnected security. He contrasts this with mentalities rooted in the Cold War, bloc politics, and hegemonic rivalry. In this telling, the old tendency to seek advantage through domination, exclusion, or military coercion is both morally questionable and increasingly ineffective. The world, Beijing suggests, cannot be governed according to the assumptions of a previous age. It requires a new consciousness of shared destiny. This rhetoric facilitates China’s assertion that it is not just pursuing its national interests but global interests, especially for those states that are being left behind by uneven development and selective multilateralism (Zhao, 2023). Its strategic importance becomes more evident when we read it alongside the current Western narratives of international order.

Since the end of the Cold War, liberal internationalism has often been positioned as the natural horizon of global politics, with market openness, democratic governance and human rights promoted as universal norms. Yet this model also coexisted with military interventions, sanctions regimes, regime-change strategies, and institutional asymmetries that many countries viewed as inconsistent with claims of universality. China’s alternative discourse does not reject global cooperation; instead, it contests who defines its terms. By emphasising sovereignty, development rights, and plural pathways to modernity, the “community of shared future for mankind” particularly appeals to countries that have experienced external pressure, conditionality, or political subordination. It suggests that the global order can be cooperative without being homogenised.

This is one reason the concept has found considerable resonance in the Global South. For many developing countries, international politics has long involved unequal exchange, dependency, and the intrusion of stronger powers into domestic decision-making. Chinese diplomacy presents the shared future idea as an antidote to these hierarchies. It tells partner countries that their development priorities matter, that infrastructure and industrial capacity are legitimate international concerns, and that political systems need not be judged according to a single civilisational template. Even where scepticism remains, this language can be politically attractive because it acknowledges longstanding grievances in the international system. It also aligns with a broader aspiration among many states for a more multipolar world in which they possess greater room for manoeuvre (Benabdallah, 2020).

The concept is closely connected to development, perhaps more than many Western interpretations recognise. In Chinese policy thinking, development is not a secondary issue subordinate to security; it is one of the main conditions of durable peace. A world divided between zones of prosperity and zones of stagnation is unlikely to be stable. Thus, building a shared future requires improving connectivity, reducing poverty, expanding trade, facilitating technological exchange, and supporting state capacity. This helps explain why the idea is so often paired with initiatives focused on roads, ports, railways, industrial parks, energy systems, digital infrastructure, and public health cooperation. China’s diplomacy suggests that material interdependence—when organised around mutual gains rather than dependency—can create constituencies for peace and partnership. In this respect, the shared future notion provides the philosophical underpinning for many aspects of Beijing’s economic statecraft.

The emphasis on interdependence also carries a distinct security dimension. China’s leaders frequently assert that security cannot be indivisible only in theory while remaining selective in practice. If one country or alliance expands its military advantages without addressing others’ concerns, tensions will rise. If sanctions, containment, and bloc confrontation become normalised, the result will be fragmentation rather than order. Within the framework of a shared future, security is conceived as common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable. This language seeks to move away from alliance-based deterrence and towards dialogue-centred security arrangements. Critics may question whether this is fully consistent with all aspects of China’s own behaviour, especially in contested regional settings, but the normative proposition remains central to Beijing’s international messaging: stability is best achieved through inclusion rather than exclusion.

One of the concept’s most notable features is its universal scope. Unlike earlier doctrines that focused more narrowly on China’s immediate neighbourhood or the developing world, the “community of shared future for mankind” is addressed to all of humanity. This gives it an expansive moral ambition. China is not only defending its own political model or calling for bilateral partnership; it is offering a general theory of how the world should think about coexistence under conditions of deep interdependence. Such universalism marks a significant evolution in Chinese diplomacy. It indicates that Beijing now sees itself as entitled, and perhaps obliged, to participate in shaping global norms and public goods.

Yet this universalism is carefully differentiated from universalist interventionism. China’s argument is not that one civilisation, ideology, or governance system should define the future for all. Rather, it proposes that the future must be shared precisely because difference is unavoidable and legitimate. This is a crucial distinction. In Beijing’s preferred telling, the problem with earlier international ideologies was not simply that they claimed moral authority, but that they often used this authority to rank societies hierarchically and to justify interference. A community of shared future, therefore, rests on pluralism: countries are linked but not identical; cooperative but still sovereign; interdependent but not subordinate. This balancing of common destiny and national autonomy is central to the concept’s appeal.

The concept’s prominence in multilateral diplomacy further illustrates its significance. China has advanced the phrase in UN forums, often linking it to support for the UN-centred international system and a larger role for developing countries in global governance. It has appeared in resolutions and declarations, signalling that at least some of its language has gained formal international recognition.

Beijing uses this to argue that this vision is not marginal or unilateral but increasingly embedded in global discourse. At the same time, the United Nations provides an ideal stage for the concept, as it is one of the few institutions built on the principle of sovereign equality, however imperfectly it is practised. China’s discourse of defending legitimate multilateralism from unilateralism and power politics builds on the notion of shared future (Richardson, 2023).

Climate change offers one of the clearest examples of how the concept operates in practice. No issue better demonstrates the impossibility of isolated national solutions. Emissions generated in one region affect all others; adaptation failures can trigger migration, instability, and humanitarian pressures across borders. In this arena, China presents itself as advocating shared but differentiated responsibilities, green development, and joint innovation. It portrays ecological interdependence as proof that humanity’s future is genuinely common. While debates continue over the adequacy of China’s own climate practices, the conceptual point is straightforward: a shared future requires recognising planetary limits and coordinating responses beyond ideological divisions. The same logic has been applied to public health, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic, when Chinese officials repeatedly argued that viruses do not distinguish between political systems and that global solidarity is a practical necessity.

A further dimension of the concept concerns legitimacy. Great powers historically have often sought to justify their influence by invoking order, civilisation, liberty, or balance. China’s formulation seeks legitimacy through the language of inclusiveness and development. Rather than claiming the right to lead because of superior values or military dominance, it claims relevance because it addresses widely felt needs: infrastructure deficits, inequality, instability, and under-representation in global governance. This is particularly important for a country whose rise has generated suspicion. By articulating a universal but non-hegemonic narrative, China attempts to counter fears that its growing power must culminate in coercive hierarchy. The shared future concept thus serves as a reassurance mechanism, even as it also broadens China’s diplomatic room for influence (Erie, 2020).

Yet it would be a mistake to dismiss the idea merely because it serves Chinese interests. All major diplomatic visions, whether liberal internationalism, the rules-based order, collective security, or the responsibility to protect, have combined principle with power. The relevant question is not whether the concept is politically situated—it clearly is—but whether it speaks to real conditions and unmet needs in world politics. On that criterion, the notion of a shared future has considerable force. The world is indeed deeply interdependent. Existing institutions do struggle to reconcile sovereignty with cooperation. Many states do feel excluded from norm-setting processes. Development disparities do continue to generate instability. And the language of zero-sum rivalry has become increasingly dangerous in an age of nuclear weapons, ecological stress, technological disruption, and economic interconnection. China’s concept gains traction precisely because it addresses these realities, even if imperfectly.

Another important aspect of the phrase is its performative function. Diplomatic language does not simply describe the world; it helps shape expectations, identities, and possibilities. By repeatedly invoking a community of shared future, China seeks to normalise a way of speaking about international relations that shifts attention from dominance to interdependence, from alliances to partnerships, and from intervention to development. Such discourse can gradually influence how states frame their own interests. If enough actors adopt the vocabulary, it becomes part of the architecture of legitimacy. This is one reason Chinese leaders have invested so heavily in promoting the concept. It is an effort to cultivate a normative environment in which China’s rise appears compatible with, and even beneficial to, broader global aspirations.

The idea also reflects an awareness of the limits of hard power alone. China’s economic size and military modernisation are important facts, but material capabilities alone do not guarantee durable international influence. Legitimacy, trust, and narrative credibility are equally vital. A country that is feared may compel compliance, but a country that is considered contributing to common goods can attract enduring partnerships. The “community of shared future for mankind” is, in this sense, part of China’s search for a language of leadership that is not imperial. It seeks to align national rejuvenation with a wider promise of shared opportunity. Whether China can consistently sustain this promise in practice remains an open question, but China’s history, even during the imperial era, shows no evidence of any imperialist or colonialist aspirations or practices, which is in itself highly revealing.

In practical terms, the concept has been translated into differentiated versions tailored to particular regions. Chinese diplomacy has spoken of communities of shared future with neighbouring countries, with Asia, with Africa, and with other specific groupings. This layered application allows Beijing to combine universal rhetoric with regional strategy. It also shows that the concept is flexible rather than rigidly doctrinal. In Southeast Asia, it may emphasise connectivity and maritime cooperation; in Africa, development and industrialisation; in Latin America, trade and South-South solidarity; in global institutions, reform and multilateralism. The adaptability of the language helps explain its longevity. It is sufficiently broad to encompass many policy arenas while retaining a recognisable core narrative.

For scholars of international relations, the concept is especially significant because it challenges familiar theoretical categories. It does not fit neatly into realist power balancing, although it is clearly linked to China’s rise. Nor is it simply liberal institutionalism, as it gives primacy to sovereignty and civilisational plurality rather than to political convergence. It bears some resemblance to solidarist conceptions of international society, yet it resists external intervention in the name of shared values. In some respects, it points towards a Sinicised vision of a pluralist global order: one in which states remain the principal actors, development is central, hierarchy is rhetorically minimised, and cooperation is justified by interdependence rather than ideological commonality. Whether the idea becomes a lasting contribution to international thought will depend partly on China’s future behaviour and partly on the willingness of other states to invest meaning in the concept (Acharya, 2014; Acharya, 2018).

The expression also speaks to a wider transition in world politics from unipolar assumptions to multipolar realities. In a more fragmented and contested international environment, no single power can easily impose order across every domain. This creates both risk and opportunity. Risk, because rival blocs may emerge and strategic mistrust may deepen. Opportunity, because a more distributed system may create incentives for negotiated coexistence and institutional innovation. China’s “community of shared future for mankind” is one attempt to give normative direction to this transition. It proposes that multipolarity should not mean chaos but a broader basis for cooperation among diverse centres of power. Whether this vision can be realised depends not only on China but also on the international system’s capacity to move beyond inherited habits of dominance.

Ultimately, the enduring importance of the concept lies in what it reveals about China’s diplomatic self-understanding under Xi Jinping. China does not wish to be seen merely as a rising power seeking advantage. It wants to be recognised as a shaper of norms, a provider of development opportunities, and a defender of a more inclusive conception of order. The “community of shared future for mankind” condenses these aspirations into a single formula. It tells the world that interdependence should lead not to fear but to cooperation; that sovereignty and global responsibility can coexist; and that the future of international order should be built through partnership rather than coercion.

References

Acharya, Amitav. “Global IR and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies.” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2014): 647–659.

Acharya, Amitav. The End of American World Order. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018.

Benabdallah, Lina. Shaping Statehood: Chinese Development and the Social Capital of Norms. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2020.

Deng, Yong. China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024.

Erie, Matthew S. “The New Legal Hubs: The Emergent Landscape of International Commercial Dispute Resolution.” Virginia Journal of International Law 60, no. 2 (2020): 225–298.

Qin, Yaqing. A Relational Theory of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Rolland, Nadège. China’s Vision for a New World Order. Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020.

Zhang, Denghua. “The Concept of ‘Community of Shared Future for Mankind’.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 23, no. 4 (2018): 587–601.

Zhao, Suisheng. The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and China’s Pivot Toward Great Power Nationalism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2023.

[1] This paper is a chapter from a book by the same author that will be published soon, China’s Global Strategy Under Xi Jinping: Trust, Development, and Sovereignty. Dr Hichem Karoui is a social scientist and journalist who authored and co-authored over 50 books on international relations, power-building, and geopolitics. He is Senior Affiliate Researcher at London Dialogue and Visiting Researcher at CARC (Shanghai International Studies University).